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be the same. But as between the surety on the completion bond and the surety on the
labor and material bond, which wogld be preferred as to earned moneys in the hands
of the State? Laski v. State,25 carried to its logical conclusion, might warrant a decision in favor of the latter. However, it is unlikely that the courts will give such an
extension to that decision even if we assume that the decision retains any vitality since
Arrow Iron Works v. Greene26 has been decided. The equity in favor of the lienor,
which was held to be superior to the surety's right of subrogation in that case, would
probably not be considered of such compelling force when urged by the lienor's
subrogee.

RECENT STATUTES
SECURED CREDITORS' DIVIDENDS IN LIQUIDATION PROCEEDINGs.-A unified basis for
the computation of dividends to be paid to secured creditors in liquidation proceedings
in New York has been enacted by legislative adoption of the Uniform Act on the
2
subject.' This new legislation is Article 2-A of the Debtor and Creditor Law. This
Uniform Act had been recommended to the New York legislature for passage at its
1941 session 3 but failed of passage. However, there was then enacted an amendment
to the Surrogate's Court Act 4 in relation to the payment of secured creditors of
insolvent decedents' estates, which adopted the bankruptcy rule of distribution formulated in the Uniform Act.
By the new legislation, the bankruptcy rule of distribution of dividends to secured
creditors is now made the governing rule in liquidation proceedings. Liquidation
proceedings, by the terms of the statute, include assignments for the benefit of creditors, liquidation of insolvent banks, equity receiverships where the subject under
receivership is insolvent, and any other proceedings for distribution of assets of any
insolvent debtor. 5 The heart of the enactment is Section 336 which provides that
"dividends paid to secured creditors shall be computed only upon the balance due
after the value of all security not exempt from the claims of unsecured creditors and
25.

Supra, note 13.

26. Supra, note 14. See language of Judge Swan in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Board
of Water Commissioners, 66 F. (2d) 730 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
1.

The UioaRm Acr has been adopted by four states in addition to New York; see

9 U. L. A. 21 (1942) ; infra, note 5. Chief credit for the drafting of the Act apparently
belongs to Judge Fred Hanson, whose scholarly article, Secured Creditor's Share of al
Insolvent Estate, appears in (1936) 34 MicH. L. REv. 309.
2. N. Y. LAWS 1942, c. 876, effective May 18, 1942.
3. Senate, Int. 1598, p. 2018; Assembly, Int. 1919, p. 2308.
4.

N. Y. SURR. CT. AcT § 212, as amended by N. Y. LAws 1941, c. 425.

5. N. Y. DEBTOR & CREDITOR LAW Art. 2-A, § 30. The UNroRm ACT makes its provisions also applicable to insolvent decedents' estates, but since New York had already
legislated in reference to them, supra note 4, the Act as adopted in New York omitted reference to such estates. The New York Act also states that it shall not apply to liquidation
of insolvent insurance companies, which is governed by N. Y. INS. LAW Art. 16, § 544 (6),
N. Y. LAWS 1932, c. 191, as amended by N. Y. LAWS 1936, c. 397.
6. 9 U. L. A. 23, § 4 (1942).
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not released or surrendered to the liquidator, is determined and credited upon the
claim secured by it."
There are four principal rules for fixing the amount of the debt on which dividends
of secured creditors are computed.7 They are the bankruptcy, the Maryland, the
Illinois, and the equity rules. Under the bankruptcy rule the secured creditor is paid
a dividend on the amount of the claim, at the time of insolvency, less the value of
the collateral he possesses. 8 The Maryland rule considers as a dividend basis the
amount actually due upon the debt at the time of declaring a dividend, without regard
to the value of the remaining collateral.9 The Illinois rule closely resembles the Maryland rule. Under the Maryland rule the time for fixing the amount of the debt which
is to serve as a basis for dividends is the dividend date; under the Illinois rule the
time for fixing the amount of the debt is the time when the claim is presented.' 0 In
both cases the value of the remaining security is disregarded in ascertaining the amount
of the debt. The equity or chancery rule permits dividends on the full amount of the
claim at the time of insolvency, with no reduction on account of security held or
liquidated. 11 Thus there exist at two extremes the bankruptcy rule which deducts the
value of the security, as evaluated at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, 12 and the equity rule which disregards the value of the security, leaving the
face value of the debt as of the date of insolvency, undiminished. The two intermediate rules, while disregarding the value of the security retained, compute the
dividends on the value of the debt actually unpaid at two later stages in the liquida14
tion proceedings.' 3 There is another rule which obtains in only one state, Kentucky.
It is generally included under the bankruptcy rule, although the two may be widely
divergent in their results. 15 In Kentucky the secured creditor does not share with
unsecured creditors in dividends until each unsecured creditor has received a percentage in dividends equal to the percentage of the secured creditor's claim protected
by collateral. It is important to note that under none of the foregoing rules, not
even the equity rule, is a secured creditor entitled to receive from all sources more
than the amount of the debt.16
7. Merrill v. National Bank of Jacksonville, 173 U. S. 131 (1899). See also annotations
in L. R. A. 1918B, 1024; 94 A. L.R. 468 (1935).
8. Re Commissioner of Banks, 241 Mass. 346, 136 N. E. 269 (1922); Re Isaacs, 246
Fed. 820, (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
9. Third Nat. Bank v. Lanahan, 66 Md. 461, 7 Atl. 615 (1887); First Nat. Bank v.
Green, 221 Ala. 201, 128 So. 394 (1930).

10. Levy v. Chicago Nat. Bank, 158 Ill. 88, 42 N. E. 129 (1895); Furness v. Union
National Bank, 147 Ill.
570, 35 N. E. 624 (1893).
11. Washington-Alaska Bank v. Dexter Horton Nat. Bank, 263 Fed. 304 (C. C. A. 9th,
1920); United States Fidelity & G. Co. v. Centropolis Bank, 17 F. (2d) 913 (C. C. A. 8th,
1927) ; McGrath v. Carnegie Trust Co., 221 N. Y. 92, 116 N. E. 787 (1917). This was also
the majority rule in the various states until changed by statutory enactments. GLENN,
CREDITOR'S RIGHTS AND REMEDIES, (1915) 434, § 544.
12. Re O'Gara Coal Co., 12 F. (2d) 426 (C. C. A. 7th, 1926), 8 Am. B. R. (N. S.) 138.
13. Practical illustrations of the various rules are given in Hanson, Secured Creditor's
Share of an Insolvent Estate, (1936) 34 MxcH. L. REv. 309.
14. Bank of Louisville v. Laughbride, 92 Ky. 472, 18 S.W. 1 (1892).
15. See supra note 12.
16. Peter A. Frasse & Co. v. Hartford Automotive Parts Co., 300 Fed. 876 (D. C. 1924).
See also L. R. A. 1918B, p. 1042.
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Aside from statutory enactments, hereinafter discussed, in New York prior to the
new legislation, the prevailing method'of determining the amount to which a secured
creditor would be entitled was upon the basis of the equity principle' In People v.
Remingtonl 7 the highest court in the state had before it for the first time the question
as to which rule of distribution should be followed in this state. The court adopted
the equity rule "as having the weight of authority in its favor" and "the one best
according with the principles and established rules of equity jurisprudence, to which
department of legal science the question pertains."'' 8 The court pointed out that the
rule prevailing in the administration of bankipt estates was an express statutory
provision which was not controlling on an equity court ruling upon the estate of an,
insolvent debtor. This view was followed by the Supreme Court of the United States
in Merrill v. Nationul Bank of Jacksonville19 where Chief Justice Fuller held that
application of the bankruptcy rule in courts of equity constitute an alteration of the
20
contract between the parties. In England the bankruptcy rule first obtained and
several of the states in this country followed suit,2 ' but the English decisions applying
the bankruptcy rule were in effect overruled in Mason v. Bogg,2 2 and the application
of the bankruptcy rule expressly rejected in Kellock's caye. 23 Later, by statute, the
applicable in all distributive proceedings,
bankruptcy rule was restored and 2 made
4
whether in chancery or bankruptcy.
The moderntrend in legislation is towards the bankruptcy rule. Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Act, New York, in keeping with this trend,2 had by statute
prescribed the bankruptcy rule as the one to be followed in assignments for the
benefit of creditors, 26 in the proceedings for the rehabilitation or liquidation of
insurance companies 27 and recently, as previously mentioned, in the administration of
insolvent decedents' estates. 28 The broad coverage of the 1942 legislation appears to
completely abolish the equity or chancery rule in .New York.
This legislation, applying as it does to nearly every type of liquidation proceeding,
was necessary since it had been held that the prior piece-meal legislation, just referred
to on the subject, did not have the effect of indicating the intention of the New York
17.
18.
19.

121 N. Y. 328, 24 N. E. 793 (1890).
Id. at 332.
173 U. S. 131 (1898).

20. Wright v. Simpson, 6 Ves. Jun. 726, 31 Eng. Rep. R. 1272 (1802) ; Greenwood v.
Taylor, 1 Russ, & M. 185, 39 Eng. Rep. R. 72 (1830).
21. Armory v. Francis, 16 Mass. 308 (1820) ; Wurtz v. Hart, 13 Iowa 515 (1862) ; Wheat
E. 394 (1890).
v. Dingle, 32 S.C. 473, 11 S.t
22.
23.

2 Myl & C. 443, 488 (1837), 40 Eng. Rep. R. 709.
L. R. 3 Ch. 769 (1868).

24. Judicature Act of 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66; Judicature Act of 1874, 37 & 38 Vict.
c. 83.
25. Bar Ass. City of N. Y., Comm. on State Legislature, Bulletin 238 (1941); CommisN
sioner's prefatory note to Uniform Act, 9 U. L. A. 21.
26. N. Y. DEBTOR & CREDITOR LAW § 15 (8) ; Re Vietor, 101 Misc. 308, 166 N. Y. Supp.
1012 (1917).

27. N. Y. INs. LAW § 544 (6),
1936, c. 397.
28.

N. Y. LAws 1932, c. 191, and amended by N. Y. LAws

N.Y. SuRR. CT. AcT § 212, as amended by N. Y. LAWS 1941, c. 425.

Prior to this

statute the equity rule governed the administration of insolvent decedents' estates. Matter
of Kearns, 139 Misc. 877, 879 (1931) ; Matter of Cooke, 147 Misc. 528 (1933).
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legislature to adopt the bankruptcy rule as a rule of universal application 29 The
change in the law of New York also appears to be a wholesome one. It may be said
in favor of the equity rule that it preserves for the secured creditor an advantage
which by his diligence he had obtained over other creditors and that for his diligence
in thus securing himself he should not be penalized by being deprived of his right
to payment along with unsecured creditors. However, while the secured creditor
possesses only a security title, and legally his possession of the security does not
constitute partial payment on the debt, from the practical as well as from the equitable
view, the creditor's retention of the security or his realization on it should amount
to a pro tanto extinguishment on the debt.
The Uniform Act contains specific provisions dealing with the security held by the
creditor. It provides that concealment of any collateral he holds, with the intention
of evading the provisions of the Act, shall deprive the creditor of his right to receive
or retain dividends unless he thereafter releases or surrenders the undisclosed security
to the liquidator 30 The Chandler Act 31 and the recently enacted amendment to the
Surrogate's Court Act 3 2 contain no express provision pertaining to the matter of
concealment of security by the creditor. The federal courts have interpreted a failure
to disclose the security as a waiver of the security, 33 and the creditor is restricted
to the receipt of dividends as a general creditor. The Uniform Act also contains
specific provisions for evaluating the security held by a creditor. The primary methods
of valuation is by an actual realization in money of the security, either by collection
where the security is an obligation for the payment of money, or by creditor's sale
where the security is of another kind. 34 Where valuation is not practicable by such
methods or where delay would result, the court may order evaluation of the security
by compromise, or by litigation in the liquidation proceeding, or by a liquidator's
sale of the assets. The latter method when approved by the court passes a good title
to the purchaser free of the liens of the secured creditor. If the method is by compromise or litigation, the liquidator may redeem such assets by paying the value so
determined if authorized by the court to do so. 3 5

By Article 2-A of the Debtor & Creditor Law, New York has adopted a uniform
policy applicable in all form of liquidation proceedings. Such unification and simplification of legislative policy are defensible and highly desirable.

SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' WxLs.-The entry of this country into the war has brought

about a change in the law of New York in relation to wills. Section 16 of the Decedent Estate Law and Section 141 of the Surrogate's Court Act have been amended'
to permit the oral devise of realty by soldiers and sailors, and to validate their
29. Andes Co-Op Dairy Co. v. Baldwin, 238 App. Div. 726, 266 N. Y. Supp. 18 (3d Dep't
1933), aff'd 263 N. Y. 578, 189 N. E. 705 (1933) ; Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Land
Estates Inc., 110 F. (2d) 617, 619 (1940).
30. N. Y. DEBTOR & CREDITOR LAW 2-A, § 32; 9 U. L. A. 23, § 4 (1942).
31. 52 STAT. 866 (1938), 11 U. S. C. A. § 93 (Supp. 1942).

Supra note 28.
33. Robinson v. Exchange Nat. Bank of Tulsa, Okl., et al., 28 F. Supp. 244 (1939).
34. N. Y. DEBTOR & CREDITOR LAW 2-A, § 34; 9 U. L. A. 23, § 5 (1942).
35. N. Y. DEBTOR & CREDITOR LAW 2-A, § 35; 9 U. L. A. 24, § 6 (1942).
32.

1. N. Y. LAWS 1942, c. 688, effective May 6, 1942.
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unattested holographic wills. Such wills hereafter will automatically become invalid
upon the expiration of one year after completion of military service. Heretofore, the
law of New York contained no provision for automatic invalidation of the informal
wills of soldiers and sailors after their discharge from service, and prior to this amendment the nuncupative wills of soldiers and sailors could bequeath only personal property and their unattested holographic wills were without effect.
Soldiers and sailors have been favored in the law of wills since the time when all
Gaul was divided into three parts.2 Caesar, in an endeavor to reward his soldiers
for their services, provided that a will made by a soldier should be valid even though
the customary formalities of execution were not complied with.3 Justinian, believing
the reason for this privilege to be the ignorance of soldiers as to testamentary matters,
restricted the exercise of it to soldiers in expeditionibus, when presumably legal advice
would not be available.4 Although the first English commentator on the law of wills
states that the testamentary privileges accorded to soldiers by the Roman Law were
carried into the common law,5 it has been pointed out that no special privileges in
regard to making wills could have been granted to English soldiers, since at common
law even civilians could make informal written or oral testaments bequeathing personalty. 6 However, whether or not at common law the wills of English soldiers were
treated differently from those of civilians, the Statute of Frauds expressly excepted
the wills of soldiers and sailors from its requirements. 7
By the Revised Statutes of 1830, New York provided that no nuncupative wll
should be valid ". . . unless made by a soldier, while in actual military service, or by
a mariner while at sea." s While this section was held to leave soldiers' and sailors'
wills entirely untrammeled, and therefore governed by the principles of the common
law, 9 an important distinction was recently pointed out by the New York Court of
Appeals. In Matter of Zaiac,10 the Surrogate admitted to probate an unattested letter
of a soldier as a valid common law testamentary disposition and also as a nuncupative
2. MuIRHEAD, RoNLw LAW (3rd ed.) 309; Matter of Thompson, 4 Bradford 154, 157
(Surr. N. Y. 1856).
3. Gaius, 6.11, reprinted in 1 ScoTT, Civi LAW (1932); Code, 6.21, reprinted in 13
ScoTT, Civi. LAW (1932) ; BUCKLAND, RomAN PRIVATE LAW (1928) 233.
4. Institutes, 2.11, reprinted in 2 ScoTT, CVm LAW (1932); BUCKLAND, op. cit. supra,
note 3 at 224.
5. SwINBumRN, TESTAmENTS AND LAST WnILs (2d ed. 1635) Part 1, § 14. See Drummond v. Parrish, 3 Curt. Eccl. Rep. 522, 183 Eng. Rep. R. 812 (1843).

6. Atkinson, Soldiers' and Sailors' Wills (1942) 28 A. B. A. J. 753.
7. Stat. 29 Car. II, cap. 3, § 23 (1676): "Provided always that notwithstanding this Act,
any soldier being in actual military service, or any mariner or seaman being at sea, may
dispose of his movables, wages and personal estate, as he or they might have done before
the making of this Act."
8. 2 N. Y. REV. STAT. (1830) § 22. This provision was continued in the Consolidated
Laws as Section 16 of the Decedent Estate Law. The common law right of nuncupation
had been greatly restricted prior to this in New York. N. Y. LAws 1787, c. 47; N. Y. LAWS
1813, c. 23, § 17. These laws however expressly provided that soldiers' and sailors' were
not affected thereby. See Matter of Kennedy, 167 N. Y. 163, 170, 60 N. E. 442, 444 (1901).
9. Hubbard v. Hubbard, 8 N. Y. 196, 199 (1853) ; Matter of Zaiac, 162 Misc. 642, 295
N. Y. Supp. 286 (Surr. Kings 1937).
10. 162 Misc. 642, 295 N. Y. Supp. 286 (Kings 1937), rev'd in 255 App. Div. 709, 5
N. Y. S. (2d) 897 (2d Dep't 1938), and modified in 279 N. Y. 545, 18 N. E. (2d) 848 (1939).
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Will under the statute. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Surrogate
admitting the letter to probate as a holographic will since its execution had not been
attested to by two subscribing witnesses as required by former Section 141 of the
Surrogate's Court Act." However, since the oral disposition had been witnessed by
the required number of witnesses for a nuncupative will 1 2 the Court directed the
probate of this nuncupative will. The court recognized the anomaly of admitting an
oral statement "depending on the frail testimony of slippery memory" or "a loose
word spoken to a comrade, vaguely understood or badly remembered", 13 and denying
probate to a letter clearly dispositive in nature, written entirely in the decedent's own
hand and signed by him,' 4 but deemed itself bound by the provisions of the Surrogate's Court Act. There seems to be no doubt that this decision played a great part
in the enactment of the amendments above referred to, at least in so far as the
probate of a holographic will is now permitted ".

.

. when written entirely in the

handwriting of the maker, even though the same be unattested."' 5
The Legislature, however, went further. Apparently in line with the present policy
of freeing the members of our armed forces from the necessity of strict compliance
with the law where such compliance is rendered difficult by reason of their military
service and would very often prove impossible, the Legislature conferred upon soldiers
and sailors the privilege of disposing of realty as well as personalty by nuncupative
or holographic will. Realty was not devisable at common law 16 until the passage of
tl~e Statute of Wills. 1 7 Today all jurisdictions allow the testamentary disposition of

real property, and a few jurisdictions even permit the oral devise of realty.' 8 The
amendments to the New York statute in this respect find precedent in legislation
11. This section required the testimony of two attesting witnesses for the probate of a
written will.

As now amended, it provides for the probate of a holographic will upon

proof of the handwriting thereof.

-

12. Two witnesses are necessary for a nuncupative will to have effect. N. Y. SuRR. CT.
ACT, § 141, and N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAW, § 16 as amended.
13. Matter of Smith, 6 Phila. 104, 106, 107 (Pa. 1865), quoted with approval by the
Surrogate in Matter of Zaiac, 162 Misc. 642, 654, 295 N. Y. Supp. 286, 300 (Surr. Kings
1937).
14. The fact that the will is holographic gives rise to various favorable inferences as to
its validity. There is a strong presumption of testamentary capacity, testamentary intent,
and the absence of fraud. Less strictness of proof is required with regard to compliance
with the statutory formalities. See Matter of Turrell, 166 N. Y. 330, 59 N. E. 910 (1901) ;
McLaughlin's Will, 2 Redfield 504 (Surr. N. Y. 1877) ; Carroll v. Norton, 3 Bradford 291
(Surr. N. Y. 1853) ; Matter of Levengston, 158 App. Div. 69, 142 N. Y. Supp. 829 (3d Dep't
1913).
15. N. Y. LAWS 1942, c. 688, § 1.
16. There is some doubt as to whether prior to the Norman Conquest there was any
generally recognized right to devise. In any event the Conquest and the resulting growth
of the feudal system put an end to any such right that might have existed. See 4 KENT,
Comm. *504, and 1 PAGE, WILLS (1926) § 11, 23 et seq.
17. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 1 (1540). See also 35 Hen. VIII, c. 5. The effect of these two
acts was to permit of the devise by written will of two-thirds of all land held by knights'
service and all lands held by socage tenure.
18. See, for instance, GEORGIA CODE (1933) § 113-504. The substance of the dispositions
must be reduced to writing within 30 days. See also Bordwell, Statute Law of Wills, (1928)
14 IOwA L. REv. 1, 30.
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passed in England in 1918.19 Whatever historical reasons may have prompted the
requirement of greater formality in the case of devises, as distinguished from bequests,
personal property is more often today of greater value than holdings of realty and
no reason appears why the disposition of the latter should be attended by more
protective limitations.
In granting a soldier or sailor the right to dispose of realty, no mention is made
whether he must have reached his majority to exercise this privilege. Section 10 of
the Decedent Estate Law provides that "All persons, except .. infants, may devise
their real estate. . . ." The amendment under consideration merely states that "No
nuncupative or unwritten or holographic will, bequeathing or devising personal or
real estate, shall be valid unless made by a soldier or sailor in actual military or
naval service . .. "20 The question is therefore presented whether it was intended
to confer upon all soldiers and sailors, regardless of age, the power to make an
informal will. The English act of 1918 expressly grants this right to devise to all
soldiers and sailors regardless of their age.21 Remembering that the reason for the
22
privilege of nuncupation is the difficulty in complying with the statutory formalities,
it may be reasoned that where the soldier is prevented from making a formal will,
not by his wartime duties, but by his youth, the purpose of the statute is not frustrated by holding the oral or holographic devise by an agent invalid. Furthermore,
as the right granted is in deyogation of the common law, it may be correct to construe it strictly. However, the fact that minors over eighteen years of age are today
considered mature enough to be conscripted into the armed services may be an
important consideration in construing the legislative intent with which the amendment
was passed. Since young men under eighteen may today volunteer for the armed
services, a similar question is involved in trying to ascertain whether, while in actual
service, such a person may orally bequeath his personalty. At common law the age
requirements for a valid testament of personal property were fourteen for males and
twelve for females.2 3 The decisions of the English courts 24 holding valid a bequest
19. Wills (Soldiers and Sailors) Act (1918) 7 & 8 Geo. V, c. 58, § 3 permits real property to pass by an informal military will.
20. N. Y. LAWS 1942, c. 688, § 1:

21. Wills (Soldiers and Sailors) Act (1918) 7 & 8 Geo. V, c. 58, § 3. "However, the
recent English property acts prevent all minors from devising real property. See Watt,
Wills in War Time, 4 CoNvEY. (N. S.) 150 (1939)." Atkinson, Soldiers' and Sailors' Wills
(1942) 28 A. B. A. '.753, 757, note 83.
22. Hubbard v. Hubbard, 12 Barbour 148, 155 (N. Y. 1851) ; In re Gibson [1941] P. 118;

In re Hiscock [19011 P. 78, 80 (1900).
23.

,

Van Weit v. Benedict, 1 Bradford 114 (N. Y. 1849); BL., Co1M.

Law rule was the same.

*497.

The Civil

See Gaius, 2.113, Ulpian, 20.13, reprinted in 1 ScoTt, Crn

LAW

(1932).

24. In re Hiscock [19011 P. 78; In re Stable [1919] P. 7; In re Vernon [1915] Vict.
L. R. 699; In re Farquhar, 4 Notes on Cases 651 (1846). Contra: In re Wernher, [1918]
1 Ch. 339, aff'd [1918] 2 Ch. 82-CA. Cf. In re Limond [1915] 2 Ch. 240 to the effect that

soldiers' and sailors' wills were left unaffected by the Statute of Frauds only in so far as
execution and attestation are concerned. See also Comment (1918) 31 HARv. L. RE. 1022,
1024. 1 PAGE, Wnas (2d ed. 1926) 61.9' states that if the Wills Act of a state excepts
soldiers and sailors from its terms and leaves them the power which they had at common
law, a person under the statutory age may make a will, but if the Act only provides for a
different and less formal method in which they can make their wills, they must be of age
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by a minor soldier under the statutory age have been codified in the English Act of
1918.25 The point does not appear to have been litigated much in the United States.
The leading American case in point holds that a soldier under the statutory age for
a formal will cannot nuncupate, bottoming its decision on the theory that the statute
requiring testators to be of a certain age did not permit of any exceptions.26 Bearing
in mind that Section 16 of the Decedent Estate Law, prior to its amendment in 1942,
in no way changed the common law as to soldiers' and sailors' wills, 27 perhaps New
York would reach a different conclusion, particularly in view of the wording of
Section 15 of the Decedent Estate Law which provides that "Every person of the
age of eighteen years or upwards, ...and no others, may give and bequeath his or
her personal estate, by will in writing" (italics added). However, by taking such a
view New York would be prohibiting a holographic bequest of a person under eighteen
28
years of age, while upholding his nuncupative bequest.
Interesting questions relating to witnesses are raised by the amendments. It is
provided therein that a nuncupative will must be ". . . made within the hearing of
two persons. . . ." In construing the section of the Surrogate's Court Act already
referred to, which requires for the probate of a nuncupative will that ". . . its
execution and the tenor thereof must be proved by at least two witnesses," it has
been uniformly held that the two witnesses need not be present simultaneously. 29
The question is thus presented whether the law in relation to nuncupative wills has
been changed in this respect. Under the amendment must the witnesses to a nuncupative will be present simultaneously? The keyword would seem to be within. If
it was not intended to require the witnesses to be present at the same time, would
it not have been more natural to use the word in? While such a line of argument
is by no means convincing it may be significant that the original bill before the
Legislature used the word inm° whereas the bill, as approved, had this word changed
to make an ordinary formal will. The New York law would appear to be in the first classification, supra, note 8.
25. Wills (Soldiers and Sailors) Act (1918) 7 & 8 Geo. V, c. 58, § 1.
26. Matter of Evans, 193 Iowa 1240, 188 N. W. 774 (1922).
See also Goodell v. Pike,
40 Vt. 319 (1867), coming to the same result on the theory that the privilege of nuncupation
is only as to the manner of execution. Contra: Henninger's Estate, 30 Pa. Dist. R. 413
(1920), holding that a soldier otherwise qualified can nuncupate personalty although under
age.
27. Supra, note 9.
28. Professor Atkinson in discussing the desirability of allowing minors to make military
wills points out that in the reported cases, minor soldiers have always made sensible wills,
which is more than can be said of their superior officers. Atkinson, Soldiers' and Sailors'
Wills (1942)

28 A. B. A. J. 753, 755.

It is of interest to note that where a will attempts to dispose of both realty and personalty.
and for some reason the realty cannot pass, the American courts hold that the personalty will

pass, unless it appears on the face of the will that the gifts were intended to be inseparable.
Mulligan v. Leonard, 46 Iowa 692 (1877) ; In re Davis, 103 Wis. 455, 79 N. W. 761 (1899).
The English Courts seem to hold that there is a presumption of the invalidity of the entire
will in such a case. Godman v. Godman [1920) P. 261.
29. Matter of Mason, 121 Misc. 142, 200 N. Y. Supp. 901 (1923) ; Matter of Mallery,
127 Misc. 784, 217 N. Y. Supp. 489 (1926), aff'd 247 N. Y. 580, 161 N. E. 190 (1928) ;
Matter of Zaiac, 162 Misc. 642, 295 N. Y. Supp. 286 (1937), reversed on another ground
279 N. Y. 545, 18 N. E. (2d) 848 (1939).
30. Ass'n. Bar of the City of New York, BULL. No. 8 (1942) p. 543.
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within.3 1 On the other hand, the term withit, might well refer to the orbit of
hearing, i.e., that the nuncupation be made in such a manner that it be heard by two
witnesses, although not necessarily at the same time. Certain it is that the emergencies of war might disclose many situations wherein such repetition is necessary.
A question also arises whether a witness to a.nuncupative will who is also a beneficiary thereof can take under it. A recent amendment to Section 27 of the Decedent
Estate Law provides that a subscribing witness cannot take under a will. 32 Since in
no sense may it be said that a witness to a nuncupative will subscribes thereto, the
section would seem to be inapplicable. Nevertheless it is a matter of prime importance
in the avoidance
of fraud that an interested witness be incompetent to establish an
33
oral will.
The 1942 amendments do not expressly require that a holographic will be subscribed or signed by the testator. Undoubtedly the widest use of this privilege of
holographic testamentary disposition will be in the form of letters. It is thus not
difficult to conceive that dispositive provisions might be contained in a post script
arranged after the signature. Will such provisions be given effect? The answer to
this question must be found in the statute. Does it create a new kind of will or
does it merely dispense with the necessity for witnesses where the instrument is in
the handwriting of the testator? If the latter, it would seem that the holograph would
have to be subscribed at the end,34 while if the former, mere signing would seen
to be enough and post script should be given effect. The fact that the new legislation
contains the only mention of a holographic will in the entire Decedent Estate Law
is some evidence that a new form of will has been set up. On the other hand the
language of the amendment, "A holographic will when written entirely in the handwriting of the maker even. though the same be itnattested (italics added)", would
seem to correlate a holograph with a formal will, the manner of execution of which
is prescribed in Section twenty-one of the Decedent Estate Law. How the point will
be handled by the courts should it come before them is difficult to say. 35
to

31. Ass'n. Bar of the City of New York, BULL. No. 8 (1942) p. 561.
32. But the amendment does not apply if there are two other subscribing witnesses who
are not beneficiaries. N. Y. LAws 1942, c. 622. This amendment was intended to remedy
the situation involved in Matter of Walters,.285 N. Y. 158, 33 N. E. (2d) 72 (1941). In
that case it was held that the former provision that a subscribing witness to a will could
not take thereunder where such will could not be proved without his testimony, did not
operate to defeat his bequest where the will had been probated upon the testimony of one
witness in accordance with Sectidn 142 of the Surrogate's Court Act, the subscribing witness
having absented himself from the state solely in order to avoid testifying and thereby save
his legacy. See (1942) 17 ST. JonN's L. REv. 50.
33. It has been held that a statute which makes a subscribing witness competent by
destroying his legacy does not apply to nuncupative wills unless by its very terms it fairly
includes them. Vrooman v. Powers, 47 Ohio St. 191, 24 N. E. 267 (1890). Note that
In re Limond, [19151 2 Ch. 240 holds that as witnesses are not required to a military holograph, they may take under it.
34. N. Y. DEC. EST. LAW, § 21 provides: "Every last will and testament . . . shall be
subscribed by the testator at the end of the will."
35. It is questionable whether a paper originally intended as a formal will, though not
perfected as such because of failure to observe all the statutory requirements, may be
established as a holographic will. The majority view is in the negative: Porter's Appeal,
10 Pa. 254 (1849); Kennedy v. Douglas, 151 N. C. 336, 66 S. E. 216 (1909). Contra:
Offutt v. Offutt, 42 Ky. (3 B. Mon.) 162 (1842).
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The one year limitation on the validity of an informal military will after discharge
from military service is a restriction on the right of nuncupation as it existed at
common law, under which the will was valid until revoked,36 as well as under the
prior wording of the New York statute.3 7 The new legislation provides that every
informal will shall become invalid upon the expiration of one year following discharge
from military or naval service, or, should the testator lack testamentary capacity at
such time, then one year after testamentary capacity has been regained. The amendment does not provide an answer to the question whether an informal will may be
revoked informally before the expiration of the statutory period of one year. Section
thirty-four of the Decedent Estate Law provides that "no will in writing" can be
revoked save by another will in writing, a formal instrument of revocation, or physical
destruction thereof. While this provision by its very terms is inapplicable to nuncupative wills it would seem, as a matter of first impression, to apply to holographic
wills. However, at common law a will, whether holographic or otherwise, could be
revoked without any particular formality,38 and if we presume that the Legislature
intended to reinstate the holographic will effective at common law, which the Court
of Appeals in Matter of Zaiac39 had been forced to find invalid, there may exist a basis
for further presuming that the Legislature did not intend the formal requirements
for revocation of formal wills to apply to this informal type of will. However, even
assuming that the underlying purpose of the amendments is to dispense with as much
formality as possible, it should be a simple matter for a soldier or sailor to revoke a
holographic will by physical destruction or by another holographic will, and no practical reason appears why the Legislature
should have intended the statutory provision
40
as to revocation to be inapplicable.
For convenience in treatment this note has refrained from considering separately
the provisions of the amendment as they apply to mariners. Before 1942 Section 16
of the Decedent Estate Law permitted nuncupative wills to be made ". . . by a soldier
while in actual military service, or by a mariner while at sea." The amendment
extends the privilege of informal testamentary disposition to ". . . a soldier or sailor
while in actual military or naval service, or by a mariner while at sea . . ." (italicized
matter added by amendments). The amendment makes a distinction between a sailor
on the one hand, and a mariner on the other, in the provision dealing with automatic
revocation. In the case of the mariner his informal will is not automatically revoked.
While formerly the term "mariner" was interpreted to include a member of the
36. Matter of Conner, 65 Misc. 403, 121 N. Y. Supp. 903 (1909) ; In re Booth, [19261
P. 118. The amendment returns to the view of the Roman Law. See Justinian, II, § 3,
reprinted in 2 ScoTT, CwV LAW (1932) ; Ulpian, 23.10, reprinted in 1 ScoTT, CvIs LAw
(1932). England has not adopted this rule.
37. N. Y. DEC. EsT. LAW, § 16.
38. Card v. Grinman, 5 Conn. 164 (1823) ; In re Pierce's Estate, 63 Wash. 437, 115 Pac.
835 (1911).
39. 279 N. Y. 545, 18 N. E. (2d) 848 (1939).
40. As a holographic will is a "will in writing" it would seem that a prior formal will
would be revoked thereby. To this effect see, Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400 (1852) ; Gordon
v. Whitlock, 92 Va. 723, 24 S. E. 342 (1896); Estate of Gossage [1921] P. 194. Contra:
In re Soher, 78 Cal. 477, 21 Pac. 8 (1889).

Cf.: In re Booth [1926] P. 118.

However, as

mere words cannot revoke a formal written will, a subsequent nuncupative will cannot
revoke a prior written will. See: Limbach v. Limbach, 290 ll. 94, 124 N. E. 859 (1919);
McCune v. House, 8 Ohio 144 (1837).
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United States Navy, 4 1 it would clearly appear that by using the term "sailor", today
popularly ascribed only to members of the armed forces, the Legislature intended to
distinguish between members of the United States Navy and members of the merchant
marine who are not bound to any period of definite service. In this connection the
English Act 42 is more specific. It provides that the nuncupative (or holographic)
will of a sailor will be given effect if it is made ". . . when he is so circumstanced
43
The bill as origthat if he- were w soldier he would be in actual military service."
right
of nuncupation
for
the
inally proposed to the New York Legislature provided
to all persons in the military, naval or air forces of the United States during a state
44
The idea behind this
of war, whether or not they were in actual military service.
proposal was that the requirement of "actual military service" was vague and the
source of much expensive litigation although the admitted dispositive wish of the
decedent was not in doubt. 45 It was pointed out, however, that the expression "actual
military service" had been definitely defined as being equivalent to "on an expedition", 46 and that the proposed extension lost sight of the reason for the exception
to the usual formalities prescribed for wills. 47 Thus the only change made as to the
persons covered was the insertion of ". . . sailors in actual .. .naval service. .. "
of this extension was the same
There would seem to be little doubt that the 4purpose
8
as that expressly avowed in the English Act.
One last inquiry remains. Is the privilege of making an informal military will
available to those women, such as the Waacs 49 and the Waves, 50 who are engaged
in noncombatant service with our armed forces? The answer to this query lies in
the nature of the duties of the particular unit concerned. As Waves are restricted
41. In re Gwin's Will, 1 Tuck. 44 (N. Y. 1865) (A commandant on a gunboat is a
mariner) ; Ex parte Thompson, 4 Bradford 154, 158 (1856) (Every person in the naval or
mercantile service, from the common seaman to the captain or admiral, is a mariner).
42. Wills (Soldiers and Sailors) Act (1918) 7 & 8 Geo. V, c. 58.
43. Supra note 2.
44. S., Pr. 1956, Int. 1595; A., Pr. 2341, Int. 1907.
45. Butler, The Wills of Soldiers and Sailors under New York Law, N. Y. L. J. Editorial,
March 17, 18 and 19, 1942.
46. Matter of Dumont, 170 Misc. 100, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 606 (1938) aff'd 257 App. Div.
952, and authorities cited therein. It must be admitted, however, that the question of
"actual military service" has been productive of more litigation than any other phase of
informal military wills. See Atkinson, Soldiers' and Sailors' Wills (1942) 28 A. B. A. J.
.753, 755.
47. Supra, note 22. See also: Assn. Bar of the City of N. Y. Bull. No. 8, p. 543 (March
27, 1942).
48. Supra, note 43. There is reason to believe that the amendment will be given retroactive effect. See Estate of Yates, [1919] P. 93. Thus the will of a sailor in actual naval
service, who died subsequent to the amendment, would most probably be probated, even
though the will was not made while at sea.
49. The Women's Army Auxiliary Corps was established by Presidential order pursuant
to authority granted by Public Law 554, 77th Congress, Chapter 312, 2nd Session, approved
May 14, 1942.
50. The Women's Naval Reserve was established by the addition of Title V to the Naval
Reserve Act of 1918 by Public Law 689, 77th Congress, Chapter 938, 2d Session (H. R.
6807), approved July 30, 1942.
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to the performance of short duty within the continental United States,51 and as this
country is not a theater of war, it is difficult to visualize a situation in which a Wave
could be said to be on or about to set out on an expedition5 2 as required for the
validity of a nuncupative or holographic will. However, should the United States
become an actual battlefield, these women, living in navy barracks 53 and therefore a
mark for enemy action, might well be said to be on an expedition, 5 4 and hence
entitled to the privilege of nuncupation. A different situation is presented by the
Waacs. While they are.authorized to serve with the Army throughout the world, they
are not members of the Army,55 and therefore would seem not to be soldiers in the
strict sense of that word. Nevertheless they are certainly in military service5 O and
the considerations motivating the extension of the right to make informal wills to a
member of the United States Army apply with equal vigor to them. It would therefore appear unquestionable that the courts, availing themselves of at least a modicum
of liberality in the field of statutory construction, will uphold the informal wills of
Waacs. The broad policy of affording all those actively engaged in the military service
of their country the maximum protection in the decedent disposition of their prop57
erty

51.

would be best effectuated thereby.

Naval Reserve Act of 1918, § 504. Thus there is no possibility of the informal will

of a Wave being upheld as being made by a mariner while at sea. In In re Stanley [1916]

P. 192 the informal will of a nurse on a hospital ship was admitted to probate as a mariner's
will.
52.
53.

Supra, note 46.
In In re Gibson, [1941] P. 118, the informal will of a member of the Army Dental

Corps who slept at home was refused probate. The court said: "The foundation of the
permitting of nuncupative wills was that a man was uprooted from civil surroundings."
It would thus seem that if the Wave were residing in civilian quarters she could not validly
make an informal will.
54. In In re Spark, [1941] P. 115, the nuncupative will of a soldier in camp in England

was probated, the court pointed out that in the present war the scope of military operations
have been very much enlarged and due to the changed circumstances a more modern interpretation than the one afforded by the older cases must be imparted to "in military service".
55.

Public Law 689, 77th Congress, Chapter 554, 2d Session, § 12.

Members of the

Army Nurses Corps, a constituent part of the United States Army, and the only other
women's organization authorized to serve with the Army, clearly have the right of informal
testamentary disposition.
56. Ibid. § 19 provides for the inclusion of a Waac in the definition of a person in
military service used in the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 1178
(1940), 50 U. S. C. A. § 501 (Supp. 1942).
57. Muzzicato, N. Y. L. J., (1942) p. 1382, col. 3, April 2, 1942.

